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Speaking of Virtue: A Republican
Approach to University Regulation
of Hate Speech
Suzanna Sherry*
There is a disturbing new trend among American universi-
ties. Many universities, both public and private, are adopting
regulations that punish what is commonly called '"hate speech."
Hate speech is expression that is viscerally offensive and de-
grading to particular segments of society, especially to women
and minorities. Almost all of these recent regulations are ex-
tremely broad and obviously content-based, and thus a tradi-
tional rights-oriented approach to freedom of expression has no
difficulty rejecting such regulations as facial violations of the
First Amendment.1 It is a tortured argument indeed that
would uphold the current type of regulations under the tradi-
tional analysis; concomitantly, demonstrating the patent uncon-
stitutionality of such regulations is all too easy. It is, of course,
possible to imagine regulations that might pass muster under
traditional first amendment jurisprudence,2 but those regula-
tions would have to be so narrow that they would rarely if ever
apply to the types of incidents that have frequently sparked the
rush toward hate speech regulations.
Many constitutional scholars, however, have recently be-
gun to explore another side of our national heritage: republi-
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
1. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 866-67 (E.D. Mich.
1989).
2. For example, regulations that treat different viewpoints equally and
restrict speech only in limited contexts might survive a first amendment chal-
lenge. See Farber & Nowak, The Misleading Nature of Public Forum Analy-
sis: Content and Context in First Amendment Adjudication, 70 VA. L. REV.
1219, 1237-39 (1984). Further, hate speech regulations limited to "fighting
words" might also pass first amendment scrutiny. See Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573-74 (1942). However, the Court has not upheld
any statutes under the "fighting words" doctrine since the Chaplinsky case in
1942. First Amendment jurisprudence has undergone a radical change since
that time and it is therefore quite likely that all or part of Chaplinsky is no
longer good law. See, e.g., 3 R. ROTUNDA, J. NowAK & J. YOUNG, TREATISE ON
CONSTrITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 197-99 (1986).
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canism. One of the intellectual influences of the founding era,
a republican viewpoint de-emphasizes individual rights in favor
of individual responsibility to the community, or civic virtue.
What makes self-government work, in the view of republicans,
is the civic virtue of individual citizens.3 In keeping with the
recognition that a rights-oriented or liberal approach may not
be appropriate to every question,4 this Essay will instead ana-
lyze hate speech regulations from a republican or virtue-based
standpoint.
I must begin by drawing a distinction between virtue and
manners. Virtue - in particular, the civic virtue that is the ba-
sis for a republican polity - is an internal state of mind. Cer-
tainly virtue is reflected in outward behavior, but true virtue
must come from within. To be virtuous, a citizen must share
the values that make for good citizenship. In other words, to
label a person as virtuous is to ascribe to her not only certain
behaviors, but certain beliefs. One cannot be virtuous unless
one subscribes to the normative underpinnings of virtue. Good
manners, on the other hand, require only that a person behave
in a particular way. Mannerly behavior does not implicate a
corresponding set of beliefs (except, of course, the tautologous
belief that one ought to behave with good manners). This is not
to say that the definition of good manners cannot vary; it is
only to point out that one can behave in a way that others de-
fine as mannerly without necessarily subscribing to the
definition.
One important consequence of this distinction between vir-
tue and manners is that only manners can be coerced.5 A gov-
ernment can enforce outward behavior, but compelling people
to behave in the way that a virtuous person would behave can-
not make people virtuous. Imagine legislation designed to co-
erce a form of civic virtue from the citizenry. A law states that
every person must vote. I do so, but because I am not truly a
3. See generally D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1-21 (1990) (discussing the intellectual origins of the
Constitution).
4. See Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism" Legal Realist Approaches
to the First Amendment, 1990 DUKE L.J. 375, 387 ("Ilt is imperative that pro-
gressive scholars begin to experiment with new ways of talking about the
problems of free expression. We must find our own voice, we must find a new
voice, before it is too late.").
5. A possible exception is that coercing virtue in children, whose intel-
lect, habits, and values are still largely unformed, may ultimately induce them




virtuous person, I vote unwisely. I might vote at random or
perhaps for those whose names are pleasing to my ear. Indeed,
if I am so unvirtuous as to be reluctant to vote, I may react to
government coercion by refusing even to consider voting seri-
ously. The government cannot compel me to make virtuous
choices without depriving me of choice altogether by telling me
who to vote for. Until I have acquired the internal habit of de-
liberately and thoughtfully choosing who will represent me, I
cannot be said to be virtuous.
American republicans and those who influenced them have
recognized the impossibility of coercing virtue. John Locke, a
major influence on eighteenth century Americans, criticized
governmental enforcement of religious virtue on philosophical
grounds: "it is one thing to persuade, another to command; one
thing to press with arguments, another with penalties."6 The
drafters of the 1787 Constitution deliberately rejected a provi-
sion enabling Congress to enact sumptuary laws, which would
have given Congress the power to regulate virtue.7 Abraham
Lincoln, who is often considered to be a direct political descen-
dant of the eighteenth century republicans,8 once said that if
you "assume to dictate [a man's] judgment, or to command his,
action, or to mark him as one to be shunned and despised,...
he will retreat within himself, close all the avenues to his head
and his heart."9 These thinkers all recognized that enforcing
virtuous behavior does not lead, in adult citizens, to internaliza-
tion of the underlying virtuous beliefs.
Compelling good manners, on the other hand, is simple. It
would, for example, be easy for the government to compel me
to vote in a mannerly way. The government might refuse to
count my vote, or perhaps even punish me in some other way,
unless I wait my turn, refrain from electioneering at the polling
place, speak pleasantly to the election officials, and place my
completed ballot in the appropriate basket. Even if I do not
agree that these are appropriate behaviors for voters, I can still
fulfill the entire purpose of the law with mannerly behavior.
The lawmakers care only about my behavior, and not about my
6. J. LOCKE, A Letter Concerning Toleration, in 6 THE WORKS OF LOCKE
11 (1801).
7. See D. FARBER & S. SHERRY, supra note 3, at 140.
8. See, e.g., G. WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA xiv-xvii (1978); D. FARBER &
S. SHERRY, supra note 3, at 253-71.
9. Address by Abraham Lincoln, Springfield, Ill. (Feb. 22, 1842), in 1 THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 273 (1953).
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beliefs. Thus, legislative fiat can make the voting process man-
nerly, but not virtuous.
So it is with behavior on campus. Universities that wish to
maintain a certain civility on campus may be able to enforce
that type of behavior coercively. Universities that wish to cre-
ate or maintain certain values in their students, however, can-
not accomplish their aim merely by coercing virtuous behavior.
Indeed, as with voting, an attempt to compel virtuous behavior
may backfire, creating nothing but resentment and a refusal to
consider the underlying normative questions. In particular,
censoring expression in an attempt to create virtue is likely to
make the censored speech more, rather than less, appealing.10
This Essay will examine whether the recent spate of uni-
versity regulations against hate speech are an attempt to coerce
manners or an attempt to coerce virtue, and will then discuss in
more detail the inappropriateness of university attempts to co-
erce virtue.
Some of the proponents of hate speech regulations appear
to be attempting to regulate manners, not virtue. One com-
mentator has in fact suggested that the proponents "wish... to
maintain or restore civility to an often uncivil environment.""
The preamble to the Ohio State University's draft regulations
notes that a purpose of the regulations is "to create and protect
an atmosphere in which all students can learn and work effec-
tively."' An official letter explaining the University of Michi-
gan policy disclaims any intent to "impos[e] a set of beliefs and
values on all members of the [university] community."'13 These
statements suggest that the proponents of hate speech regula-
tions simply wish to coerce the manners necessary for a civil
environment on university campuses.
However, more thorough analysis of the application of
hate speech regulations, as well as a closer reading of the actual
policies and the written justifications for the promulgation of
10. Strossen, Regulating Racist Speech on Campus: A Modest Proposal?,
1990 DUKE L.J. 484, 554 & n.358.
11. O'Neil, Colleges Should Seek Educational Alternatives to Rules that
Override the Historic Guarantees of Free Speech, Chron. of Higher Educ., Oct.
18, 1989, at B1, col. 1.
12. OHIO STATE UNIvERSITY, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND DISCRIMINA-
TION/DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT POLICIES 1 (draft Apr. 4, 1990) [hereinaf-
ter OHIO STATE POLICY] (on file with author).
13. Letter from John Schwartz, Advisor to the Director of Affirmative
Action, University of Michigan, to the University Community (Mar. 7, 1989)
(on file with author).
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these policies, belies the notion that the motivation is the regu-
lation of manners.
The proposed and actual applications of hate speech regula-
tions provide the most persuasive evidence that such regula-
tions are designed to improve the virtue of an unvirtuous
population. Sanctions seem to depend not ,so much on the
speaker's civility (or lack of it) as on his or her political view-
point. Moreover, rude speech is apparently perfectly acceptable
as long as it does not betray wrongheaded ideas.
One advocate of hate speech regulations, for example, pro-
vides a list of examples of speech that would or would not be
prohibited under her scheme: anti-white speech by blacks
would be permitted, but not anti-Semitic speech by blacks or
whites. Zionism would be permitted only to the extent that it
"aris[es] out of the Jewish experience of persecution," but not
where it is a statement of white supremacy (the latter, presum-
ably, typified by Arab-Israeli conflicts). Claims that the Holo-
caust never occurred would be prohibited, for such claims "are
just as hateful, for all [their] tone of distorted rationality," as
other anti-Semitic speech. Finally, as to collecting and display-
ing Nazi regalia or similarly hateful symbols, the Anti-Defama-
tion League would be permitted to do so but a hypothetical
"Gestapo Collector's Club" would not.14
Another influential proponent of hate speech regulations
notes explicitly that the evil of hate speech depends in large
part on "the context of the power relationships within which
[the] speech takes place."' 5 Thus, for example, his proposal
"would prohibit a white woman from disparaging a black or gay
man, but not a white, heterosexual man.' '16 Moreover, neither
epithets such as "honky" nor the demeaning and silencing of
political conservatives would qualify as prohibitable hate
speech.' 7 Another law professor proposed a similar hierarchy
on the ground that "[c]alling a white a 'honky' . . . is not the
same as calling a black a 'nigger'" and thus only the latter
should be punished.'8
14. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech. Considering the Victim's
Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2361-70 (1989).
15. Lawrence, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating Racist Speech on
Campus, 1990 DuKE L.J. 431, 456.
16. Strossen, supra note 10, at 559 n.387 (paraphrasing Professor Law-
rence's oral clarification of his proposal).
17. Lawrence, supra note 15, at 450 n.82, 455-56, 477 n.160.




Motivation is obviously everything in this scheme. Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union Director Morton Halperin has also
noticed this bias, commenting that he could find "no cases
where universities discipline students for views or opinions on
the Left, or for racist comments against non-minorities."' 9
Formal or informal sanctions have also been applied to
speech that is perfectly civil and rational, if it is considered to
display an unvirtuous state of mind. The University of Michi-
gan regulations were applied against a student who stated in a
social work class that he believed that homosexuality was a dis-
ease and that he "intended to develop a counseling plan for
changing gay clients to straight,"20 and against a student who
stated in an orientation session that he had heard minorities
had a difficult time, and were not treated fairly, in a particular
course.21 Yet University of Michigan administrators refused to
act on another student's complaint, ruling that a similarly civil
classroom comment that "Jews cynically used the Holocaust to
justify Israel's policies toward the Palestinians" was protected
speech.22 Condemnation of Israeli policies is apparently politi-
cally correct enough to remove any taint of anti-Semitism from
the remark.
At least one proponent of hate speech regulations would
apparently also ban politically incorrect remarks from serious
faculty discussions. Professor Charles Lawrence of the Stan-
ford law faculty draws an analogy between the racially moti-
vated defacement of a Beethoven poster (an incident that is
frequently cited as an example of punishable hate speech by ad-
vocates of regulation) and the faculty discussion of whether to
retain the Western Civilization curriculum at Stanford, imply-
ing that he would censor the latter if he could.2 3
A pamphlet intended as an interpretive guide to enforce-
ment accompanied the University of Michigan's regulations,
and serves as a further illustration of proposed applications of
hate speech regulations.24 According to this guide, discrimina-
tory harassment has occurred if "[a] male student makes re-
marks in class like 'Women just aren't as good in this field as
19. See Finn, The Campus: "An Island of Repression in a Sea of Free-
dom," COMMENTARY, Sept. 1989, at 17, 21 (quoting Morton Halperin).
20. Doe v. University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. 852, 865 (E.D. Mich. 1989).
21. Id. at 865-66 n.14.
22. Id. at 866.
23. Lawrence, supra note 15, at 479 n.165.
24. The University of Michigan later withdrew the pamphlet. University
of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 859-60.
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men.' "2 Apparently, this statement by a man would be sanc-
tionable no matter how dispassionate the discussion and no
matter what evidence was offered to support the claim, but
would be perfectly permissible if made by a woman. Discrimi-
natory harassment has also occurred, according to the interpre-
tive guide, if "[s]tudents in a residence hall have a floor party
and invite everyone on their floor except one person because
they think she might be a lesbian."26 Because the hate speech
regulation only prohibits speech or behavior that "stigmatizes
or victimizes an individual on the basis of race, ethnicity, reli-
gion, sex, sexual orientation, creed, national origin, ancestry,
age, marital status, handicap or Vietnam-era veteran status,"
2 7
students refusing to invite someone to a floor party because she
is overweight and unattractive, or because she is shy and no-
body likes her, presumably would be permitted to act equally
rudely. A particular brand of political virtue, not civility, is the
crux of the policy.
Unvirtuous students and faculty have suffered even in the
absence of new hate speech regulations. An editor and a
cartoonist for the University of California at Los Angeles stu-
dent newspaper were suspended for running a cartoon in which
a rooster, asked how he got into the University of California at
Los Angeles, replies, "affirmative action."28 At Dartmouth, a
student received a grade of "D" on a French exam, despite his
excellent French, because he refused to condemn the
Dartmouth Review, which had recently been involved in a con-
tretemps with a black music professor. The exam asked stu-
dents to evaluate the Review (in French). The student did so in
excellent French, but failed to condemn the Review. The pro-
fessor declared that she could not "in good conscience reward
an 'A' to someone who is writing racist remarks, no matter how
well it is said."' 29 Students at the Harvard Law School accused
25. UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN, WHAT STUDENTS SHOULD KNow ABOUT Dis.
CRII1NATION AND DISCRIMINATORY HARASSMENT BY STUDENTS IN THE UNIVER-
SITY ENVIRONMENT 1, quoted in University of Michigan, 721 F. Supp. at 857-58.
26. Id at 2.
27. UNIVERSITY OF MCHIGAN, DISCRIMINATION AND DISCRIMINATORY HAR-
ASSMENT BY STUDENTS IN THE UNIVERSITY ENVIRONMENT 3 (Fall 1988) [herein-
after UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN POLICY], quoted in University of Michigan, 721
F. Supp. at 856.
28. Hentoff, Free Speech on the Campus, THE PROGRESSIVE, May 1989, at
12.
29. The Privileged Class, Wall St. J., Sept. 20, 1989, at A24, col. 1. The ad-
ministration ultimately supported the student, but the incident is representa-
tive of the trend toward enforced orthodoxy.
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a visiting professor of sexism - and sent letters to administra-
tors in an attempt to prevent the school from making the pro-
fessor a tenure offer - for asking whether "sauce for the
goose, sauce for the gander" was sexist and for suggesting that
successful contract negotiation contained important psychologi-
cal elements analogous to. those in successful lovemaking.30
The justifications given by proponents of hate speech regu-
lation provide further evidence of the intent to regulate virtue.
The Ohio State preamble noted above, for example, states that
"acceptance, appreciation of diversity, and respect for the rights
of others must be institutional values for a major public univer-
sity and are values that it must impart to its students and to
society as a whole.13 1 The most thoughtful and thorough schol-
arly defense of hate speech regulations distinguishes hate
speech from speech advocating Marxism by noting that racism,
unlike Marxism, is "universally condemned" and "wrong, both
morally and factually."3 2 The president of a major public uni-
versity forwarded his proposed hate speech regulation to the
university chancellors with a cover letter that noted that the
university "strives to create campuses that foster the values of
mutual respect and tolerance. '3 3 Another public university's
policy states that the "[u]niversity community is dedicated...
to the development of ethical and responsible persons," which
includes "tolerance of and support for cultural, ethnic, and ra-
cial differences." A public law school has threatened to im-
pose sanctions for any speech that indicates that "the student
lacks 'sufficient moral character to be admitted to the practice
of law.' "5 One draft regulation goes so far as to state that the
university's mission includes combating intolerance, which it
defines as "an attitude, feeling or belief" of prejudice based on
certain listed characteristics. 36 All of these justifications for
30. MacNeil, Letter to the Editor, COMMENTARY, Mar. 1990, at 10-11.
31. OHIO STATE PoLIcY, supra note 12, at 1-2 (emphasis added).
32. Matsuda, supra note 14, at 2359-60 & n.203; see also Chen, Preface to
Jens B. Koepke's The University of California Hate Speech Policy: A Good
Heart in Ill-Fitting Garb, 12 HASTINGS CoMM. & ENT. L.J. 593, 594 (1990)
("Students ignorant of our history of racial injustice and hostile to affirmative
action must be taught about the history of American race relations, the strug-
gle for civil rights, the principles of equality, and the value of diversity.").
33. Letter from David Pierpont Gardner to the Chancellors of the Univer-
sity of California (Sept. 21, 1989) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
34. KANSAS STATE UNIVERSITY, PoLcY PROHmITING RACIAL AND/OR ETH-
NIC HARASSMENT I (rev. Nov. 1989) (emphasis added) (on file with author).
35. Matsuda, supra note 14, at 2370 n.248 (quoting a proposed policy at
SUNY-Buffalo Law School) (emphasis added).
36. PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, PoLIciEs AND RULES FOR STu-
[Vol. 75:933
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hate speech regulations clearly depend on the underlying as-
sumptions that hate speech is sinful as well as uncivil, and that
a university ought to curb the sinful impulses of its students.
The addition of hate speech regulations to many student
codes of conduct which already prohibit harassment without
defining it in terms of victimized groups further illustrates that
these universities are attempting to coerce particular values
rather than merely to create a civil environment. One univer-
sity currently prohibits "[p]hysically abusing, harassing, or in-
tentionally inflicting severe emotional distress upon a member
of the university community."3 7 Nevertheless, this same uni-
versity is considering a proposed additional policy condemning
hate speech, which is defined as "the use of racial epithets by a
dominant group or member of a dominant group to oppress,
harass, or fluster a member of a subordinate group."
' 8
In contrast, a few universities have already recognized that
civility is not dependent on iace, gender or other similar char-
acteristics. In response to a request for regulations "which pro-
hibit speech that libels, stereotypes, etc. women and members
of minority groups," one university counsel provided, without
further ado, its code of student conduct: the relevant portion of
that code simply prohibits "[h]arassing, annoying or alarming
another person... [or] addressing abusive language to any per-
son."3 9 Another university apparently used the typical list of
protected characteristics only as an example: "An individual
who harasses another because of his or her race, sex, sexual ori-
entation, ethnic background, religion, expression of opinion, or
any other factor irrelevant to participation in the free exchange
of ideas" is subject to discipline.40
The actions and statements of proponents of hate speech
DENTS 1 (draft Oct. 13, 1989) (emphasis added) (on file with author). The
listed characteristics are the usual ones: "race, color, national origin, gender,
sexual orientation or political or religious belief." Id The University of Mich-
igan policy adds age, marital status, handicap, and Vietnam-era veteran status.
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN POLICY, supra note 27, at 3. Every other actual or
proposed policy (except the generalized ones discussed infra in text accompa-
nying notes 39-40) lists some combination of these characteristics.
37. WASHBURN UNIVERSITY OF TOPEKA, STUDENT DISCIPLINARY CODE
§ 11(7) (on file with author).
38. WASHBURN UNIVERSITY OF TOPEKA, PROPOSED STATEMENT ON LEARN-
ING ENVIRONMENT 1 (May 7, 1990) (on file with author).
39. UNIVERSITY OF LOUISVIILE, CODE OF STUDENT CONDUCT § 7.t (rev.
May 1, 1990) (on file with author).
40. UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, STUDENT RESPONSIBILITIES POLICY (pream-
ble) (emphasis added) (on file with author). Whether the listed characteristics
are in fact exemplary or exhaustive can only be determined by an examination
1991]
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regulations thus demonstrate that the regulations are indeed
intended to legislate virtue, not manners. The regulations are
an attempt to dictate primarily how students (and faculty)
think, and only secondarily (if at all) how they behave. As
such, the regulations are a part of the larger movement in
higher education toward enforcement of a "politically correct"
orthodoxy.41 The remainder of this Essay will consider the ex-
tent to which university attempts to coerce virtue are appropri-
ate in a republican polity.
I see two major problems with such university attempts to
coerce virtue. Both deal mainly with the differences between
primary and secondary education on the one hand, and univer-
sity education on the other. First, unlike primary and secon-
dary schools, producing virtuous, responsible citizens is not a
major purpose of the university, and indeed conflicts with more
important purposes. Second, even if improving the virtue of its
students were a legitimate university purpose, coercion at the
university level cannot accomplish this goal.
Teaching virtue is at least arguably one of the purposes of
primary and secondary education. A republican polity in par-
ticular would recognize the importance of instilling in children
the values and virtues necessary for life in that democratic soci-
ety. Historically, public education in the United States was in
fact designed to transmit shared moral values, including civic
virtue.4 Many modern scholars - especially neo-republicans
of one sort or another - also stress the necessity of allowing
schools to transmit values rather than remaining ideologically
neutral.43 This indoctrination aspect of primary and secondary
of how the regulation has been applied, but that information is not publicly
available.
41. See Bernstein, The Rising Hegemony of the Politically Correct, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 28, 1990, § 4 (Week in Review), at 1, col. 1.
42. Rebell, Schools, Values, and the Courts, 7 YALE L. & PoL'Y REV. 275,
280-82 (1989).
43. See, e.g., W. BENNETT, OUR CHILDREN AND OUR COUNTRY: IMPROVING
AMERICA's SCHOOLS AND AFFIRMING THE COMMON CULTURE 15-26, 69-102
(1988); A. GUTMANN, DEMOCRATIC EDUCATION 48-52 (1987); Ingber, Socializa-
tion, Indoctrination, or the "Pall of Orthodoxy". Value Training in the Public
Schools, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 15, 19 (suggesting that value transmission still re-
quires a respect for autonomy); Levin, Educating Youth for Citizenship: The
Conflict Between Authority and Individual Rights in the Public School, 95
YALE L.J. 1647, 1654-55 (1986) (same); Sherry, Outlaw Blues (Book Review), 87
MICH. L. REV. 1418, 1434-36 (1989); Developments in the Law: Academic Free-
dom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1053 (1968) [hereinafter Developments]. See also
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 681 (1986) (reaffirming
Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76-77 (1978), in stating that objective of public
[Vol. 75:933
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education is, of course, still controversial. Some scholars would
restrict or prohibit explicit value transmission at any educa-
tional level," and some suggest that virtue is best taught by ex-
ample rather than by force.45 Finally even some who concede
the importance of value inculcation would restrict it to the
classroom, and not allow coercive action to infect more volun-
tary spheres.46
Even assuming, however, that value inculcation is a legiti-
mate function of primary and secondary schools, that does not
necessarily mean that it is legitimate at the university level.
Although one purpose of primary and secondary education is
the transmission of societal values, the main purpose of a uni-
versity is the search for knowledge. University students and
faculty participate together in a disinterested search for truth.41
For that reason, any coercive curtailment of unpopular view-
points in the name of virtue is inconsistent with the very foun-
dation of a university education. One scholar has insightfully
captured the essence of this inconsistency:
A school cannot ban the Students for a Democratic Society from cam-
pus because it disagrees with or fears its social goals, but it can ban
fraternities if it views them as trivial and anti-intellectual. This dis-
education is the inculcation of fundamental values); Board of Education v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982) (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) (stating that
school officials must be permitted to design curricula that transmit community
values).
44. See, ag., B. AcKERmAN, SocIAL JuSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE 162
(1980); Gottlieb, In the Name of Patriotism: The Constitutionality of "Bend-
ing" History in Public Secondary Schools, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 497, 498-500
(1987); Yudof, When Governments Speak- Towards A Theory of Government
Expression and the First Amendment, 57 TEX. L. REv. 863, 876-78 (1979). See
also Ingber, supra note 43, at 21-25 (suggesting that value transmission should
still respect autonomy and expose children to alternative beliefs); Tushnet,
Free Erpression and the Young Adult. A Constitutional Framework, 1976 U.
ILL. L. F. 746, 749 (suggesting that value inculcation might be less appropriate
at primary and secondary levels because of children's inability to think criti-
cally about what they are told).
45. See, ag., Pico, 457 U.S. at 882 (Blackmun, J., concurring); A. GUT-
MANN, supra note 43, at 57.
46. See Pico, 457 U.S. at 869 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion).
47. See, e.g., Byrne, Academic Freedom A "Special Concern of the First
Amendment", 99 YALE L.J. 251, 258-59 (1989) (discussing functions of univer-
sity in general, although contending that only faculty engage in search for
truth); Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers
to Determine What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293, 1297, 1342-44 (1976)
(noting different purposes of different educational levels); Ingber, supra note
43, at 33 (defining function of university as search for truth); Developments,
supra note 43, at 1050 (noting different functions, but suggesting that knowl-
edge discovery occurs to some extent at all levels).
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tinction is valuable, because it permits a college to make choices that
promote educational values while deterring sectarian exclusivity.48
Moreover, even if value inculcation is one legitimate function of
a university, it cannot be permitted in this context because it
conflicts with the more important function of critical analysis.49
Finally, even if the most important university function is
value transmission - which would be a sad commentary on the
state of American universities - using coercive methods in an
attempt to inculcate virtue in young adults is bound to fail.
Most studies suggest that civics courses and other attempts to
inculcate civic virtue are unsuccessful, even at the high school
level, because students have already acquired a nearly unalter-
able belief system.50 Only teaching critical thinking might in-
duce them to change their minds. 51 Hate speech regulations, by
suppressing or eliminating the need for critical thought about
crucial social issues, undermine even this possibility. Moreover,
enforcing virtuous behavior reduces the likelihood of producing
truly virtuous citizens, because virtue requires taking responsi-
bility for one's actions, and taking responsibility requires
choice.5 2 Finally, coercing tolerance of cultural diversity - the
stated goal of many hate speech regulations - is especially dif-
ficult: as one author has noted, "you cannot indoctrinate for
pluralism."53
In summary, university hate speech regulations, as an at-
tempt to coerce virtue rather than manners, are both illegiti-
mate and unlikely to succeed. This condemnation applies
whether one takes the traditional rights-oriented approach or
the more innovative republican view. Hate speech regulations
are thus explainable only as the use of raw political power to
enforce orthodoxy.
48. Byrne, supra note 47, at 316-17 (citation omitted).
49. See Barnes, Report of The Committee on Freedom of Expression at
Yale, 4 HuM. RTS. 357 (1975).
50. See, e.g., R. DAWSON, K. PREwlTT & K. DAWSON, POLITICAL SOCIALIZA-
TION 141-44 (2d ed. 1977); Langton & Jennings, Political Socialization and the
High School Civics Curriculum in the United States, 62 AM. POL. Sci. REV.
852, 858-59 (1968); Van Geel, The Search for Constitutional Limits on Govern-
mental Authority to Inculcate Youth, 62 TEx. L. REV. 197, 263-89 (1983).
51. See A. GUTMANN, supra note 43, at 173.
52. See, e.g., Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 301
(1988); Sherry, Righting an UnToritten Constitution, 64 Cm.-KENT L. REV.
1001, 1010 (1988).
53. Lowenthal, The University's Autonomy versus Social Priorities, in
UNIVERSITIES IN THE WESTERN WORLD 75, 81 (P. Seabury ed. 1975).
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